Censorship as Catalyst for Artistic Innovation

One kind of government-supported censorship of the arts targets not the expressive content of any particular artwork but instead seeks to suppress the activity of a group of people based on some feature of the group’s human identity such as race, gender or class. Using examples from the history of the development of black music in the United States that followed from the legal oppression of slavery and from evidence of changes in the Punjabi theater in Pakistan following state-sanctioned suppressions of women, this paper demonstrates that human identity-related arts censorship can actually serve to spur and enhance, rather than suppress, artistic innovation

Appreciating Dance: The View from the Audience

Dance can be appreciated from all sorts of perspectives: For instance, by the dancer while dancing, by the choreographer while watching in the wings, by the musician in the orchestra pit who accompanies the dance, or by the loved-one of a dancer who watches while hoping that the dancer performs well and avoids injury. This essay will consider what it takes to appreciate dance from the perspective of a seated, non-moving audience member. A dance appreciator in this position is typically someone who can hear and see, who can feel vibrations of sound through their skin, and who can have other human, kinaesthetic responses and perceptions as well as the cognitive ability to process them. This appreciator is also someone who is a person with a history that may or may not include experiences of dance that have conditioned his or her responses to watching dance. Based on both this experience, and the skill and capacity to focus, pay attention, make judgments, and convey those judgments, there are different types and levels of audience appreciation. This essay will consider three: 1. Innocent Eye Appreciation, 2. Dance-Trained Appreciation, and 3. Critical Appreciation

A Philosopher Explains Why Dance Can Help Pandemic-Proof Your Kids

Dance is good because it expresses human nature – it’s not just fun, although it is certainly fun. It’s not just exercise, either. At its best, dance is an extension and expression of who we are as human beings in ways that can allow us to share emotions that increase our sense of community and connection. This is why, in good times and bad, in times of war, slavery, fleeing homelands and during pandemics, kids still bounce, leap and spin

Review: \u27Improvising Improvisation: From Out of Philosophy, Music, Dance, and Literature\u27

This book review attempts to interpret the meaning and value of Gary Peters’ book in a way that is true to the kind of book, an experimental improvisation, that it purports to be. As such, it grapples with the difficulties of evaluating the merits of a philosophical discussion within a book that claims not to be philosophy and case studies in performance that beg the question of whether they accurately exemplify the (non-)philosophy they are meant to support. Despite these difficulties, this review ends with the conclusion that this book does, in fact, convey something essential about the nature of improvisation, even if it does so ironically, by demonstrating the benefits and limits of what improvisational riffs on philosophy can be

Dancing Philosophy: What Happens to Philosophy when Considered from the Point of View of a Dancer

Western philosophical aesthetics tends to answer the question, “What is art?” by starting with the perspective of the art appreciator. What does the spectator perceive in the artistic entity at issue? For example, are these properties formal and tangible, an arrangement of lines and colors as provided by Clive Bell’s theory of significant form? Are they contextual—are they, for example, the expression of the experience of a particular culture? Or are these properties relational in the sense of being a comment on or response to another art-historical movement, such as Cubism? Starting from this perspective, the methodology tends to begin with the appreciator’s response to the artistic object or product and deriving the artistic entity itself from that. The methodology then either stops there or takes a look around to see the historical context in which the art entity arose. It may even go one step further back to artistic intentions, but with care to avoid running afoul of the intentional or genetic fallacies. Whatever intentions of the artist count must be in the art entity or the appreciative experience of the art entity and not solely in the inaccessible mind of the artist. It is the perspective of the appreciator that makes “objective” definitions of art and accounts of the ontology of artworks, art events, and art practices, defensible. They are answerable to what can be demonstrated to be true by attention to some feature or property that is accessible to the reader either in theory or in conjunction with an experience of the art entity. Examples of this methodological approach can be found in abundance in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, The British Journal of Aesthetics, and anthologies of articles on aesthetics and the philosophy of art

Dancing in Time

This chapter will analyze the experience and, in particular the conscious experience, of dancing in time from the perspective of the trained dancer while performing. The focus is thus on the experience and consciousness of a dancer who is moving her body in time rather than on the experience of a seated audience member or dance appreciator who is watching a dancer move. The question of how temporality is experienced in dance by the appreciator will therefore not be addressed here. The primary kind of “experience” that will be the focus of my discussion of temporal experience comes from classical pragmatists William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey, for whom experience is “a series of purposive bodily activities immersed in the ongoing flow of organism-environment interactions” (Johnson 2006: 48). The mind-body engaged in this experience, according to the pragmatists, is one that is sensate to its environmental stimuli and interactions while acting within it. Both Peirce and Dewey, for example, view the person as a “psycho-physical” organism – one that is conscious of both qualitative experiences such as feelings towards the environment (attraction, repulsion, and the like) as well as physical sensations (see Peirce 1998/1892: 263 and Dewey 2008/1925: 229). James acknowledges that we are aware of qualitative aspects of our experience such as sensations of difference or change (see James 1950/1890a: 495). My account of the experience of dancing in time will also include conscious aspects of this experience (what-it-feels-like-to-the-dancer herself) as well as any sensorimotor pre-conscious or 2 non-conscious processes of which she is not aware by virtue of her bodily engagement with the world (cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty 2008/1945: 235-239)

Perceiving Live Improvisation in the Performing Arts

This chapter will explore the ways that live improvisational performances by professional-level actors, musicians, and dancers, take place at both cognitive and sub-cognitive levels in ways that are relevant for understanding perception and appreciation of the performing arts. First, evidence from cognitive science will be used to show that improvising, as in a dance or a music jam session or a scene in theatre, may involve physical responses that occur before we are conscious of the event to which we are responding. Second, this chapter will demonstrate how understanding these cognitive processes can help us to pinpoint why live improvisational performances have aesthetic value. Next, this chapter will consider the extent to which critical appreciation involves the enrichment and supplementation of perceptual experience with interpretive practice. Like the improvising performing artist, the audience member, too, has cognitive processes that occur before conscious articulation of what they have perceived. This means that evaluative judgments of live improvisation in the arts, like the improvisatory decisions that are made by the performers in the performances that they are judging, are not made at the purely perceptual level.https://ecommons.udayton.edu/books/1022/thumbnail.jp

Review: \u27Body Aesthetics\u27

This is a book review of Sherri Irvin\u27s edited book Body Aesthetics, a collection of 16 essays exploring a wide range of perspectives on the human body and how it is embodied, lived, viewed, perceived, and constructed by ourselves and by others in both positive and harmful ways. The book’s contributors include philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, and artists, as well as scholars who focus on law, culture, and Africana, race, gender, sexuality, and disability studies

Review: \u27Embodied Philosophy in Dance: Gaga and Ohad Naharin’s Movement Research\u27

This book is an original and complex philosophy of dance that Katan (now Katan-Schmid) has extrapolated from a close examination of and studio-based engagement with Gaga, Ohad Naharin’s style of contemporary dance movement. It is culled from Katan’s first-hand experience as a participant in the training and as a researcher in conversation with Naharin and Gaga-engaged dancers. Gaga is both practiced alone as somatic movement research (one which studies internal, bodily perception and experience) and exhibited in dances that are choreographed by Naharin and other collaborators for the Batsheva Dance Company of Tel-Aviv, Israel. The philosophy provided here is organic and closely tied to Gaga, although the relevancy and resonance of this philosophic achievement for dance and other types of movement philosophy is indisputable. The reader can make extensions from Katan’s theory to the aesthetic, felt, and understood qualities of other types of dance movement research practices, as well as to other kinds of dance events offered for appreciation as theatre or concert art, but these extensions are not Katan’s main focus

Diversified Philosophy

In this essay, Aili Bresnahan notes that institutions and many others are working to diversify the field of philosophy, in terms of the persons who count as philosophers, what counts as a legitimate philosophical methodology, and which phenomena and entities it handles. She writes that this is a positive development that will enrich and enliven the field so that, ultimately, philosophy survives